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TORPEDOMAN
Ron Smith served as a torpedoman on a U.S. Navy diesel sub in combat in
the Pacific during W.W.II. This book is his first-person memoir of his
gripping experiences at sea and on leave during that period. While
lacking the sophisticated editing common to most books from bigger
publishing houses, Ron's vivid and candid writing style in TORPEDOMAN
pulls you close and doesn't let go -- so you won't mind sailing past the
occasional typo or awkward grammar. Ron Smith "tells it like it was"
from the deckplate level, and doesn't pull any punches. Atmospheric,
enthralling, packed with fascinating trivia of life aboard the old
"smokeboats," and with plenty of stirring combat action and great
sailor's humor too, this is, simply put, a must-read volume. I was
privileged to meet Ron at a submariner conference back in 2000, and he
really impressed me. I was far more impressed by the time I finished
reading TORPEDOMAN.
PRINCIPALS OF MARITIME STRATEGY
Originally published in London in 1911, this book was reprinted as part
of the U.S. Naval Institute's "Classics of Sea Power" series. Julian
Corbett has been called "the UK's A.T. Mahan." (Mahan, by the way, who
wrote many great books on sea power just a few years before Corbett did,
is considered to be just about America's greatest theorist on the grand
strategy of naval affairs.) SOME PRINCIPALS OF MARITIME STRATEGY is a
true classic in its field, and grew out of notes Corbett prepared for
the academic professional training of the Royal Navy's future officers
-- the same way Mahan's primary books grew out of lecture notes he used
at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Corbett's writing style is
dense, but what he says is deeply thought out and very important. There
are some interesting differences between what Corbett and Mahan say on
some points, but this seems to be explained mostly by Corbett having
analyzed things and drawn conclusions from a very UK-centric
perspective. That is, both Corbett and Mahan studied some of the same
historical naval battles and campaigns from before the American
Revolution, and Great Britain was a direct participant in most of these
battles while Mahan viewed them with more detachment and perhaps with
greater objectivity. I highly recommend Corbett's book to any serious
student of naval history and strategy.
THE FIFTY YEAR WAR: CONFLICT AND STRATEGY IN THE COLD WAR
Norman Friedman is one of my favorite modern writers on naval affairs.
His style combines depth of knowledge with clarity of prose in such a
way that what might otherwise be ponderous tomes instead become lively
page-turners. THE FIFTY YEAR WAR is no exception. In fact its content
represents some worthy branching out for Dr. Friedman, as in this book
he touches on many political, economic, and land-military issues that
were as significant to the general flow and outcome of the Cold War as
were the secret head-to-head jousting contests between U.S. and Soviet
subs and certain celebrated undersea espionage capers. This book is
extremely eye-opening, as some of it is based on new material that was
only first declassified after the USSR collapsed, and some is based on
Friedman's impressive ability to make connections between seemingly
unrelated matters, and on his keen eye for telling details that credibly
support shocking revelations. As one example, in the early 1950s Mao
Tze Tung seriously urged Stalin to launch a full-scale nuclear war to
the death again America. Mao's idea was that, since Russia and China
combined had such a bigger population and land area than the U.S.,
they'd by sheer numbers inevitably be the ultimate winners, even if the
U.S. had a larger nuclear arsenal at the time. Mao expected it would
take about 200 years for the survivors to rebuild a semblance of modern
civilization, but that civilization would be a purely communist one.
Fortunately, Stalin declined Mao's kind offer. As another example,
"detente" in the 1970s, as seen by several American presidents of both
parties, was pitched to the U.S. public as a reduction of tensions with
Moscow, when in fact detente was based on the belief, post-Vietnam, that
the U.S. would eventually lose the Cold War and so had better reach an
accommodation with the Kremlin before it was too late. Only when Russia
made the mistake of invading Afghanistan, and Ronald Reagan moved into
the Oval Office, was "detente" abandoned for an aggressive
confrontational strategy that within a decade succeeded in ending the
Cold War on favorable terms for America. THE FIFTY YEAR WAR definitely
gives you a lot to think about!
PLAGUES AND PEOPLES
At a time when gobal concern about deadly pandemics is running at an all
time high, it's useful to read this fascinating discussion of epidemics
and their interplay with human migration patterns over the past several
hundred years. Aside from being great reading on its own, PLAGUES AND
PEOPLES can provide some perspective about current fears of Avian flu
mutating into a lethal human strain and then spreading globally. Be
very afraid! Fatal epidemics have repeatedly emerged from one isolated
area and then moved outward killing millions as modern civilization's
travel patterns expanded and changed. The section about how malaria
originated in Africa but then began to appear in tropical climes
worldwide, in exact concurrence with human movements on sailing ships
during the Great Age of Exploration, is just one case in point among
many. Even the origin of AIDS as possibly having been spread from
monkeys to humans has certain disturbing parallels in one theory on the
emergence of syphilis -- another sexually transmitted disease which used
to amount to a slow and horrible death sentence. I won't say more. Read
the book.
THE LITTLE ICE AGE: HOW CLIMATE MADE HISTORY, 1300 - 1850
Just as PLAGUES AND PEOPLES gives a strong historical context for modern
fears of a global disease pandemic, THE LITTLE ICE AGE provides insights
and perspective for the current debate raging over what to do about
global warming. The little ice age, as it became known, was a period of
several centuries during which the earth's climate was unusually cold.
The public health, sociological, agricultural, political, and military
effects of this trend were profound. The freezing and then thawing of
the little ice age occurred mostly before human production of greenhouse
gases was big enough to have any significance, which suggests that our
planet's climate is a more delicate and volatile thing even than many
people realize. Unfortunately, some factors affecting average
temperatures, and disrupting feedback-correction cycles built into the
natural environment, seem to be beyond human control. These include
dust and gases released from volcanoes, subtle cyclical fluctuations in
the size and brightness of the sun, small but chaotic perturbations of
the earth's orbit due to the gravitational tug of Jupiter, and random
variations in the rate at which the earth is bombarded by high-energy
cosmic rays from deep space. This would seem to suggest that humanity
needs to do two things simultaneously, when so far we aren't doing a
very good job of either: promptly reduce the greenhouse gases that we
ourselves create, but also prepare for our home planet to get warmer
anyway and for the sea level to rise. People, no matter how united in
their purpose, can't fight the forces of geology and astronomy. THE
LITTLE ICE AGE offers an object lesson on that.
by Ron Smith, trade paperback,195 pages. Originally self-published by
Ron Smith in 1993, many additional print runs since then.
by Julian S. Corbett, hardcover, 351 pages. 1988 reprint, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.
by Norman Friedman, hardcover, 597 pages. 2000, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, MD.
by William H. McNeill, trade paperback, 340 pages. 1989, Anchor Books, NY.
by Brian Fagan, trade paperback, 246 pages, with maps and diagrams.
2000, Basic Books, NY
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