There are two observations Mahan made that strike me as particularly relevant to the U.S. today in Iraq. I want to emphasize that although Mahan wrote primarily of naval theory, and passed away almost a century ago (at age 75), his observations are nevertheless very valuable. He knew a lot about land battle, including guerrilla warfare (in the form it took in Spain against Napoleon’s domination) -- and while growing up Mahan’s dad was Dean of Faculty at West Point! Mahan understood amphibious combat via his study of naval events. He lived through periods of big technological change, in both civilian life and the military; he was no stranger to the human stresses and opportunities brought on by new gadgetry. Like other commentators, he knew that certain principles of war are nearly universal. I’ll make some specific reference to historical campaigns that Mahan wrote about -- the conclusions might seem startling in their modernity.

First, in his own words, these are Mahan’s two key Iraq-related observations:

1. Good men in bad ships will usually beat bad men in good ships.

2. When liberating enemy territory from a dictator, and an uprising or insurrection is occurring or is expected, you must bring with you adequate force to defeat the dictator’s army decisively, entirely on your own.

Mahan derived these conclusions from studying many battles between 1660 and 1815 -- nor was he ignorant of numerous wars fought later, up to the time of his piercing analyses at the turn of the twentieth century.

Observation 1.

Here, Mahan does not mean good or bad in the sense of good versus evil. What he means is that well-trained, experienced, strongly motivated officers and men aboard ships of indifferent technical qualities will defeat fancy ships led and served by virtual landlubbers. Early in the Napoleonic Wars, say roughly 1795 to 1800ish, France and Spain, while united as enemies of Great Britain, unquestionably had better ships with regard to their design characteristics. British ships were a bit slower and less maneuverable, everything else being equal -- which was a very big “if.” In actuality, British seamanship so outclassed that of France and Spain, and the physical upkeep of what ships she had was so much better, that British fleets in battle more than made up for their weaker sailing qualities. In addition, overall, French and Spanish ships-of-the-line had greater weight of metal in their broadsides -- in modern terms, superior firepower. But British gunners were brilliant at handling their pieces in heaving seas against moving targets, while French and Spanish gunners were definitely not. In simple terms, a right bloody-big cannon isn’t of much real use if its crew can’t hit the side of a barn with the thing, let alone the side of a British three-decker.

Mahan’s observation applies to combat in Iraq on several levels. For one, maintenance troops who don’t clean their assault rifles are like “bad men in good ships.” The M-16 is a very effective weapon, but not if its owner allows it to be clogged by sand and dust. The multiple controversies over “Saving Private Lynch” might never have come to pass, if the soldiers on that maintenance convoy had taken proper care of their weapons.

The asymmetries of Fourth Generation warfare, Baathist style, are arguably also illustrations of Mahan’s Observation 1. American troops who rely on World War II-type tactics to fight a hit-and-run foe are in a sense like Mahan’s “bad men in good ships.” Of course, lest you begin to howl at me immediately, our troops are not bad men or women. And their equipment, for the most part, is very good. But when their leadership, training, and tactics are all applied in the wrong way, their units become like those French and Spanish battleships: They’re the incorrect combination for the specific enemy they face. Terrorists who can kill and wound and then vanish into the landscape are like the “good men in bad ships” because they make the most of their tools and their opportunities. They have very poor large-scale command and control, and no air power at all, yet they keep adding to the American, Allied, and friendly Iraqi lists of WIAs and KIAs. It’s tragic, troubling, and embarrassing. In Mahanian terms, we need “good people AND good ships.”

The solution is already being implemented to some degree in the front lines and at the Pentagon: Improved weapons training, and making sure everyone in the U.S. Army thinks of themself as a rifleman first -- which is a long-standing tradition of the Marines, so it’s definitely feasible. More thorough intell and recon data, through such efforts as the Air Force/Army joint program Project Eyes, and better recruiting and use of human intelligence assets. Lessons taken on civil relations and quasi law enforcement urban tactics from the British Army. A soul-searching rethink on proper use of helos flying low over unsecured areas. And so on.

Observation 2.

Here, Mahan means exactly what he says. If you intend to conquer enemy territory, topple a totalitarian regime, liberate an oppressed people, or however you choose to phrase it, it’s a mistake to count on significant support from local folks unhappy with their lot from before you showed up. Though the down-trodden population might even be on the verge of an open civil war against the dictator you want to eliminate, beware, A.T. Mahan teaches -- beware indeed. Local self-pride in any culture will be high. Loyalty will lie with their home country, not with you. Resentment of outside help will rise to the surface very quickly. Instead of lasting gratitude, you as the supposed liberator will all too soon be seen instead as an occupier, an invader. So definitely do not go in there undermanned, and don’t expect the things they throw at you to be flowers forever. Before you know it, the flowers will change into rotten tomatoes, or hand grenades.

The relevance of this to Iraq should be pretty obvious. And the situation isn’t totally bad. The law-abiding citizens of Iraq who always hated Saddam Hussein are rarely the people shooting at us now. Decades of infrastructure-neglect seem to be getting repaired faster than more damage can be done by various anarchist groups. But there has been a definite sea change in that parched land these past few months. Some people openly fear that Saddam will yet return. Others, feeling America’s job is done now, are eager for us -- and foreign terrorists alike -- to get out and let them have their country back. But many question if the reconstruction job can ever be finished, and if the influx of anti-U.S. warriors from abroad can really be stanched.

We are certainly in no danger of being forced to withdraw by a major military threat, as did the outnumbered British from the key French port of Toulon after the French Revolution -- when the pro-Monarchy faction of “rebels under arms” there proved unexpectedly weak and cowardly, and regular army formations from the new Republican (anti-Monarchist) government in Paris began to arrive. Nor are we in the dire straits of those British troops who invaded the U.S. southern colonies after 1776 based solely on the word of a handful of people loyal to King George III -- only to find that there was bitter resistance, not a popular uprising, the end result of which was the catastrophic British surrender at Yorktown.

What Observation 2 does show, by these ironic historical examples, is that human nature is constant over space and time. Whether the U.S. went into Iraq with too few troops will probably be debated endlessly, including by scholars a hundred years from now. But Mahan should open our eyes to better understand the trend in sentiments among Iraqis. Was our pre-planning for the peacekeeping badly deficient? Can we harness Iraqi nationalism to defeat the foreign extremists now being drawn onto their soil? We did at last get unanimous support from the U.N. Security Council. The fundraiser meeting in Spain was more successful than the White House expected. A few other nations’ troops are moving to support ours and the UK’s in a slow trickle. But the political and monetary costs of completing the democracy-building task are very high, regardless of the form and schedule any U.S. exit strategy will actually take. How much would it have cost in the long-run, though, to just sit back and mourn passively after 9/11/01?

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan would be the first to say that war is at best a mixed experience. Quagmires and intelligence blunders abound even for the victor -- the Huertgen Forest and the Bulge in WWII are just one generation’s proof of that. Objective truth, unbiased news, are always among the first casualties. If Mahan is looking down at Operation Iraqi Freedom from the afterlife, he’d probably give us a 2.5 out of 4.0, tell us to hit the books harder and smarter, and next time try to make a better grade.

JoeBuff.Com / Joe Buff Inc. Joe Buff, President Dutchess County, New York E-Mail readermail@JoeBuff.Com