The solutions, as always in international relations, are more ambiguous, more open to subjective interpretation and emotional political debate. This can work to America's advantage, or to our serious disadvantage, depending on our ability to maintain clarity of thought, sweat the nuances, and derive and apply the correct lessons of history. In this writer's considered opinion, certain "empowering doctrines" demand more clear articulation.

1. International law has been and will continue to be a fungible entity. This is because such law seeks to govern over constituencies which by their nature possess the ultimate level of sovereignty, i.e., independent countries. International law must be respected, but it also must be seen for what it is: not a blocker to action but rather a malleable tool for literally "enforcing" democracy and freedom. Armed intercession by America and our Allies, across the frontiers of sovereign states, has been, and is, and will continue to be necessitated and justified by the principle of "hot pursuit" against aggressors everywhere. To hesitate and let the bad guys "get away" will always in the end be a costly mistake.

2. Diplomacy and economic sanctions are not decisive against a determined and patient rogue state or terror-guerrilla organization. "Non-lethal" methods of action-at-a-distance aimed at totalitarian regimes harm innocent civilian populations but fail to unseat the dictators. The willingness to use American armed force consequently must be ever-present, real, and clearly demonstrated to actual and potential adversaries at all times. Policies or rules of engagement which fixate on limiting friendly casualties as the sole or prime objective will almost certainly mis-position our forces relative to meaningful national goals, and, worse, will lastingly diminish those forces' deterrent power. To be effective in containing aggression, American military personnel and assets must be forward-deployed and placed at risk -- but in a manner that is calculated, not foolhardy.

3. A key duty of U.S. political and military senior leadership is to enable American military assets to actively engage an armed enemy in a manner such as to minimize risk of friendly and collateral losses. This requires -- perhaps supremely so, above any other single requirement -- complete and unbiased intelligence on enemy dispositions and capabilities. Underinvestment in the time, money, and skill-sets needed for good intelligence gathering, interpretation, and dissemination will bring a disproportionately large subsequent cost in bloodshed and diminished geopolitical credibility. Risk minimization also requires superb training and equipping of our troops. But failure or perceived failure may occur when superb armed services are applied in piecemeal or indecisive ways. The most fundamental guiding principle of warfighting is to use overwhelming force to achieve specific, real-world war aims as rapidly as possible. In war, quasi war, undeclared war, police actions, or other hybrid states of purposeful violence, the overweening maxim is the exact opposite of "Speed kills." Speed saves lives.

4. It is fundamental to intelligence analysis and military operations to assess enemy capabilities, not just intent. Capabilities, such as to assemble and deploy weapons of mass destruction, can with effort be quantified in facts and figures. Enemy intent, by its very nature, amounts to attempted mind-reading, a process rife with chances for error or delay. Weapons of mass destruction represent a new form of threat consistent with a branch of applied mathematics known as "catastrophe theory," namely the real potential for a sudden and apocalyptic alteration in the balance of power and/or in the number of friendly casualties sustained. The looming presence of weapons of mass destruction in an enemy "camp," or even documented but failed attempts to obtain such weapons, constitutes sufficient demonstration of capability or near-capability so as to warrant immediate and absolute containment of the threat. In mathematical catastrophe theory, a moment's hesitation or a hair's breath miscalculation can lead to utterly disastrous and irreversible consequences. Weapons of mass destruction alter the very calculus of war.

5. The need to communicate among ourselves in clear, simple, easily comprehended terms must not be allowed to force our thinking into oversimplified modes of deciding and acting. Analogies from previous historical events, ranging from the appeasement at Munich before World War Two, to the tragic misjudgments of Vietnam -- to more recent failures of implementation or even loss of common sense, including the Marine barracks in Beirut, and the ineffectual visitation to Somalia -- demonstrate that history is not purely cyclical. Every situation is different, and often the most subtle differences are the most important in properly shaping and re-shaping foreign policy, from one year to the next or even from day to day. Above all else we must not let ourselves be mesmerized or paralyzed by our own slogans and catch-phrases: We must couple deep thoughts and strong deeds.

History -- the linear trend of events over time -- is by its nature cumulative. But ingrained methods of learning from history might inadvertently become outdated. Our enemies abroad certainly observe and learn from our public conduct, and they seek to exploit or "game" against our predictable behaviors. Armed strife thus extends into the intellectual sphere, just as it did in the Cold War. To be most sure that our national muscle does not lapse into misapplied mayhem, we need to intentionally escalate this struggle-to-learn to a higher plane of "meta-learning" from our own (and our enemies') past reactions to and perceptions of history. Old errors can yield modern wisdom. The conscious and diligent application of learning tools such as the five empowering doctrines itemized above represents potentially one of our greatest strengths in time of peril.

JoeBuff.Com / Joe Buff Inc. Joe Buff, President Dutchess County, New York E-Mail readermail@JoeBuff.Com