Joseph J. Buff
Joe Buff Inc.
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Milan, NY 12571
joebuff@joebuff.com



NO “COLD WAR TO END ALL COLD WARS” – PART 1
By Joe Buff



Executive Summary
The persistent claims in some media and political quarters that America’s nuclear submarines are “Cold War relics” is invalidated in this two-part article by a multi-pronged attack on both 1) the underlying flawed post-Cold War military history involved, and 2) the sheer bad logical syllogism inherent in these claims. The U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force was instrumental in winning the Cold War against the USSR; the Soviet Union fell but this did not in any way make nuclear subs antiquated or irrelevant.

This is particularly true for America’s survivable strategic nuclear deterrent ballistic missile subs, its SSBN fleet: The Russian Republic retained (or regained) all of the nuclear warhead stocks owned by the USSR in 1991. While steep reductions have been made by the U.S. and Russia alike, this has mainly been to reduce the massive “overkill” of tens of thousands of Cold War strategic weapons that could have wiped out all humanity several times over. Recently, Russia has been modernizing her nuclear warheads and delivery systems, increasing in both capacity and capability these tools for not just nuclear deterrence but also nuclear blackmail and nuclear destruction. Russia’s deployed tactical nuclear weapons, designed for use on local battlefields, outnumber NATO’s by about ten to one. The trend since 1991 across eastern EUCOM (U.S. European Command), and in CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) as well, in the Russian Federation’s repeated near-abroad aggressions – and in Moscow’s ongoing interference in U.S.-supported Middle East peacekeeping efforts (including in Libya, and now Syria with its mounting cross-Med immigration crisis) – indicates that either the Cold War never really ended, or a New Cold War by Russia has begun. Either way, we dare not send the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force into retirement. Other compelling national deterrence and defense needs also guarantee that nuclear subs must remain front-line tools for peace maintenance and peace restoration: 1) Nuclear armed China’s non-transparent military rise and territorial expansionism, and her own nuclear arsenal expansion and modernization including (reportedly) the recent introduction of destabilizing, escalatory land-based MIRVed ICBMs; plus 2) multiple U.S./NATO/UN overseas contingency operations and containment challenges against brutal dictatorships, terrorists (and the state sponsors of terrorism), and other armed groups – such as in North Korea and Iran, and continuing in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

The danger of bloody conflict will always be prevalent so long as the world has a running supply of talented, ambitious clinical sociopaths, some of whom claw their way to absolute power, seize control of armies and arsenals, and commit aggressive wars and ethnic/religious genocides. Perhaps only nuclear weapons are frightening enough as a deterrent to force even sociopathic – and other – dictatorships (nuclear armed and nuke wannabes alike) away from hot war toward cold war and from rearmament toward disarmament. We have already seen that our nuclear submarines’ superior designs and tactics can force a nuclear-armed adversary in a cold war onto the path toward (at least temporary, but decades-long) arms reduction and incrementally greater democracy. Thus, it is a U.S. national imperative that adequate funding be sustained for sufficiently numerous and promptly-built new SSBN(X) strategic deterrent subs (the OHIO-class replacements), more VIRGINIA-class fast attack SSNs in general, and the extended-hull SSGN-capable VIRGINIAs (with the Virginia Payload Module – VPM) in particular. These vessels and their crews remain vital to current and future national security, homeland defense, and world peace and prosperity.

“Up North” Calling: Key Trends in EUCOM Submarine Events vs. U.S. Logic and Rhetoric
In 1991, the dreary, gulag-infested Soviet Union broke apart. The lengthy Cold War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact came to an end. Courageous, self-sacrificing American and UK nuclear submariners, and their awesomely capable vessels, played a major role in this Cold War Victory. They pushed, and the Sovs fell. (France maintained her own independent force of SSBNs and SSNs.) Best of all, the end of the Cold War was achieved without nuclear weapons being used in combat, without open warfare being fought in the heart of Europe, and with significant casualties being confined to brutal but limited proxy battles in far flung places such as Korea, Vietnam, Central America, the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan. It was a political, economic, and technological triumph for the West, in which ever-modernizing undersea warfare coupled with everything else, from multi-domain major weapons systems to Radio Free Europe to selective trade embargoes, to targeted foreign aid, to back-corridor diplomacy, produced the desired result after decades of tension and strife. The United States accordingly celebrated and congratulated itself – and most deservedly so!

Worth a special shout-out is that perhaps one of the most significant single achievements of this overall Cold War Victory was to greatly increase the strategic depth of the forces of freedom on the European continent, with excellent consequences for potential future U.S. declared nuclear deterrence policy. During the height of the military standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, along the edge of the Iron Curtain that ran right through the middle of divided Germany, America refrained from renouncing the option for the first use of nuclear weapons for defense. This was because of the ever-present danger of an overwhelming assault by USSR-led Warsaw Pact conventional ground forces, driving for the English Channel. The distance from the Iron Curtain to the English Channel was less than 500 statute miles. Then, the geopolitical changes since 1991 that ended the Iron Curtain, expanded NATO eastward, and freed many republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to become independent countries, moved the front line between freedom and tyranny about one thousand statute miles to the east. These same changes also greatly reduced the military manpower and other assets available under Moscow’s control. The probability that a Russian Republic conventional ground onslaught from her own borders toward the English Channel would be “unstoppable” by conventional defenses alone appears to be low. Thus, the U.S. now has the option to renounce any first use of nuclear weapons in this theater, in line with national policy to reduce reliance on nukes, and in support of our longstanding Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.

But some people (of many different ethnic groups and nationalities), born and raised under the system of Soviet Communism, saw and still see things differently. They felt that the U.S. had relatively little to do with the ultimate failure of a flawed and stifling economic system their own citizenry had “known” was doomed for years. They said and still say loudly that American triumphalism was mere bullying, not only short-term and childish but deeply offensive to ex-Soviets’, now Russians’ natural sense of personal pride and collective national ego. They emphasize that the USSR’s predecessor-and-successor entity, Russia, boasts centuries of cultural and imperial greatness that are destined to continue despite – even egged on by – the fading chimera of U.S. “unipolarism.”

This article develops some solutions to what has become an apparent disconnect over time, between the evident current world situation on the one hand and sufficient funding to implement America’s national undersea warfare policy and strategy on the other hand. Said disconnect is caused in part by public information flows that too often don’t gain wide enough traction and “stickiness.” This disconnect is degrading national awareness of vital security tasks. Sometimes, failed or forgotten idea flows have led to what seems like a domestic anti-submarine warfare of words. That disconnect has only recently, apparently, been redressed – and precariously (temporarily?) so – by the positive funding decisions of a volatile, gridlocked, and sequestration-prone United States Congress. The dangerous verbal ASW disconnect can be characterized by contrasting in some detail, as we will further below, two broad tendencies of the past 25 years:

1. The repeated and continuing declaration by some commentators that the “Russia threat” has been beaten once and for all and that America has “no more big enemies:” This view has, in particular, fomented the belief that the U.S. Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet could safely, permanently be cut in half (it was) – and that the remainder and their replacement vessels are “Cold War relics” that should be discontinued altogether as obsolete wastes of money, or thermonuclear warmongering symbols, or both.

2. The ongoing military expansionism and interference with international peace processes by the Russian Federation: This has been epitomized but by no means limited to the increasingly nationalistic/xenophobic, autocratic rule of Vladimir Putin since 2000. This expansionist jingoism is transpiring both in Russia domestically and throughout her near abroad and beyond. It has included, in rough chronological order, deadly armed conflicts instigated and/or supported by Moscow since 1991 in the North Caucasus, Moldova, the Balkans, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. It has also included ongoing (now escalating?) psychological-economic warfare with the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). It also includes a revamping and revitalizing of the Russian Navy’s nuclear and diesel/AIP submarine fleet (including new sub-launched thermonuclear ballistic missiles and cruise missiles). It furthermore includes the expansion of power-projection bases and military assets such as the attempted acquisition of several modern amphibious warfare ships from France, the seizing of advantageous naval basing/support territory on the Black Sea (Crimea) – and most recently (as of this writing in late October, 2015) the development of a military airbase at Latakia, Syria, close to an existing Russian naval base at Tartus (on Syria’s Eastern-Mediterranean coast), in further support of brutal local dictator Bashar al-Assad.

Confronting Complexity: Pressing Need for the Broadest View, and Balance
Of course, other countries and sub-national entities besides Russia have presented, or do or will present serious strategic threats to any American-led system of constructive, open world order, basic human freedoms, and stable peace. Those threating, destructive forces and trends all call for diligent governmental and societal education/learning, better understanding, and especially a more concerted regimen of retaining cognizance of not-so-old-fashioned, experience-driven, geopolitical parables and aphorisms. This would enable the American public and Congress to more fully grasp and support the inexorable, perpetual need for ample security spending for strong defense preparedness. As folks both rich and poor, and corporations large and small, all need to remember, We must invest in defense in order to defend our investments and savings. This essential spending must always include adequate budgeting for strong naval forces in general and for adequate nuclear submarine strategic-deterrent and fast-attack/land-attack forces in particular. The notion in some quarters that America’s genuinely job-creating and honestly tax-paying defense industry is no more than some bloated, venal, politicized “sacred cow” must be debunked and debunked again; in the long run, it is a matter of life and death for us all.

The broad spectrum of world defense needs has to be seen as an integrated tapestry of readiness requirements that demand a global, holistic approach to financing, rather than as competing geographic theaters and competing acquisition expenditures that all want to hog the available funds. Much has been said and done, and more attention and action are needed, about China’s maritime rise, North Korea’s conventional and nuclear provocations, Iran’s stubborn (and maybe still viable?) nuclear cravings and state sponsorship of terrorism, Libya’s and Syria’s unresolved civil wars, the mounting atrocities of ISIS, the continuing threat from al Qaeda, ongoing strains on the beleaguered State of Israel’s self defense, ethnic cleansings (genocide) hither and yon, and various separatist movements (some peaceful and some quite bloody) on different continents. Compounding these human bad-behavior phenomena are the destabilizing effects of global energy insecurity, and of rampant man-made and natural climate change. These include sea level rise and coastline inundations (including of naval bases), ice cap melting and altered sea routes, plus pandemic diseases and pestilence, famine, drought, rampant poverty – and consequent worldwide human migration crises, militant and organized-crime infiltrations, and terrorist recruitment. To cope successfully, given this plethora of inter-related defense demands, two traditional American traits have to stay at the fore: clarity of perception, and good teamwork. Two more of our greatest traits must not be allowed to fail us now: amazing ingenuity under stress, and resourcefulness in a crisis.

Over human generations the world order is always changing, in broad trends punctuated by discontinuous jolts. These jolts, such as the Arab Spring upheaval, are often not widely anticipated and are not necessarily democratizing. The fact is, nobody knows what sort of regime will be in power in twenty years in troubled/troubling countries such as China or Russia or Iran, and nobody knows today what might be the status then, if any, of some Islamic caliphate (or caliphates). Nor does anybody know now the ultimate 21st century outcome of today’s pushing and shoving in the world between an American-led global system of “both win” compromise and engagement, and a “winner take all” confrontational system dominated by repressive, paranoid totalitarians. Extraordinary dangers demand extraordinary preparedness.

Some Facts of Existential Importance
This article focuses primarily on Russia. I discuss how the uncertainties and risks posed to American, Allied, and friendly vital interests, and to good world order, by Russia’s anti-democratic, neo-kleptocratic expansionism and interference, are sufficient in themselves to prove something of existential importance: American nuclear subs are vital survivable nuclear deterrents, indispensable counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) platforms, and most of all nobody’s “relics.” Regime changes, of the sort we have seen in Moscow via the fall of the USSR almost 25 years ago now – and more recently in Iraq and then Libya, with the removal of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi – cannot be counted on soon to truly reform all the world’s bad behaviors. This is particularly so when the international community currently contains (at a minimum) the large, aggressive nuclear power, Russia, that traces its forceful achievements and domineering psyche back to before Czar Peter the Great (1672-1725).

The recent series of leaders of the USSR/Russian Federation since the mid 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev (for 6 years), then Boris Yeltsin (for 9 years), then Vladimir Putin (for 16 years and counting with a place-holding assist from Dmitry Medvedev), were each once proclaimed in the West as a democratist of his time. Today they can perhaps best be viewed as something else. They form a cohort of “next-gen” successors in a resilient, self-perpetuating Russia/Moscow/Kremlin-centered totalitarian bureaucracy. That system, though communism was dropped in favor of private ownership and free markets, still very much puts the power of the Russian state above the will of the people and their human rights. It rates territorial acquisition above both the safety of its own abused conscript soldiers, and above the lives and well being of Russia’s diverse internal regions and external, sovereign neighbors.

Flawed Logic Leads to Bad Decisions and Wrong Actions.
A syllogism is a fancy term for any chain of logic, whether that logic is correct or erroneous. A simple example is “A implies B is a true statement, and A is a true statement, therefore B must be true.” This particular syllogism is as rock-solidly valid as logic can get. But logic sometimes becomes twisted into false, and consequently misleading, invalid reasoning – whether by an accidental misunderstanding or intentional rhetorical legerdemain (or even by adversary propaganda). But this present article is not about fixing blame; it is about helping avoid dangerous errors in defense budget right-sizings and final allocations.

By way of illustration, an example of flawed logic, popular in basic math textbooks, goes like so: “All men are mortal, and Socrates is not a man, therefore Socrates is immortal.” This doesn’t work, as proven by a valid counterexample: Actually-mortal Socrates might well be a cat or a parakeet. The flawed syllogism involved is the incorrect claim that “A implies B, and not-A, together imply not-B.” One relevant instance of just such faulty thinking, recurrently encountered throughout the debate about U.S. defense needs subsequent to the end of the USSR, goes something like this: “American nuclear submarines helped win the Cold War. The Cold War is over. Therefore American nuclear submarines are relics.” National defense gets into dire straits whenever such wrongful reasoning crops up. Yet it keeps cropping up.

(Technically speaking, we can dissect this claim into a flawed syllogism as follows: Let A be the statement “The Cold War is on.” Let B be the statement “Nuclear Subs are Vital.” The flawed logic about subs as Cold War relics amounts to claiming that because A implies B, then also not A implies not B. But this plainly doesn’t work.) The following are some actual examples from the media. Most are from The New York Times. I do not wish to single out that fine publication for negative criticism – rather, my wife and I have it delivered as our primary source of daily printed news, so I am familiar with its content over the years. I believe three examples demonstrate adequately the defense flawed-logic problem under discussion; other examples in newspapers, magazines, and blogs abound.

• First example: an editorial or op-ed I vividly remember reading on-line, from a Northeastern U.S. regional newspaper. It was published during the 2005 Base Reduction And Closure (BRAC) debate, about whether to close Groton, CT’s Naval Submarine Base New London. I can’t find it by a Google search now; perhaps it was subsequently taken down – which in Internet practice can be a form of retraction. I cite it here, but without attribution, because it is so very indicative of the problem. I recall it had the punchy title “Nobody Hunts for Red October Any More.” The premise was that Russia had become a true, lasting friend of democracy and the West. Thus, there was no more need for the heroic espionage and undersea jousting by SSNs – let alone the strategic nuclear deterrent patrols by SSBNs – that were depicted in the late Tom Clancy’s classic. Thus, so the opinion piece’s reasoning went, there was no more need for the sub base in Groton.

• Second example: indirect but telling, the New York Times op-ed “Highly Enriched Danger,” published March 21, 2014, by Alan Kuperman and Frank Von Hippel. It argued that the very existence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in American nuclear submarine (and aircraft carrier) propulsion reactors presents such great dangers to world peace (nuclear accident, terrorist theft, loophole to weapons non-proliferation) that the U.S. Navy should change back to lower purity (i.e., non weapons grade) reactor fuel. The piece emphasized post-Cold War nuclear disarmament aspirations in, I think, something of a geopolitical vacuum. Its thesis would also have set back American naval submarine propulsion system design, and tactical capabilities, by decades. This is because HEU allows for massive net cost savings over the lifetime of the VIRGINIA class and the future SSBN(X) class, while also permitting much greater continuous operational availability of each vessel. This better cost/benefit performance, per hull constructed and for the fleet overall, is achieved by HEU allowing the “life-of-ship reactor core” design. A life-of-ship rector core avoids the need for the multiple periodic, lengthy, expensive (and hazardous) dockyard stays required to replenish the (highly radioactive and toxic) Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) spent fuel rods. Such refueling layovers mean added opportunities for said rods to easily be turned into spectacular dirty bombs in situ by determined terrorists, by them simply using a conventional high-explosive bomb in a truck or delivery drone. Though details are highly classified, it also seems likely there would be important sacrifices of overall ship’s mission success-and-survival capabilities (and/or yet other excessive design, fabrication, and maintenance costs), if the Navy were to revert to using a bulkier (and noisier?) reactor system with the substantially weaker propulsive-work density of LEU, compared to the preferred HEU.

• Third example: the editorial “How to Pay for a 21-st Century Military” which ran in The New York Times on December 20, 2008. It claimed there was “plenty of fat in the defense budget” because of “unneeded weapons systems.” One key recommendation in the piece was “Halt production of the Virginia class sub.” It said they were “modeled on the cold-war-era Seawolf” as if that was something bad, ignoring the many transformational advances (and major cost savings) of VIRGINIA over SEAWOLF. It called the VIRGINIA-class program “little more than a public works project to keep Newport News, Va., and Groton, Conn., naval shipyards in business.”

The second example above seems to miss the most vital point altogether, which is that any such nuclear fuel changeover from HEU back to LEU would, by substantially increasing total lifetime costs per vessel, significantly reduce the affordable number of American (and UK) SSNs/SSGNs and SSBNs in commission in the foreseeable future. That future has already for some time been projected to be one where the size of the U.S. Sub Force fleet will be too small for the global demand signal. (This is not a new problem. Nor is the unhelpful suggestion of our subs using LEU instead something new – it was mentioned in The New York Times for August 29, 2000, in an op-ed by disarmament expert James Clay Moltz, “The Kursk Was in Dangerous Company.”)

Granted the third example dates back to 2008 – but it was published soon after Russia was responsible, among various other belligerent acts to be detailed below, for a violent and bloody war of conquest against the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, in the South Caucasus. That war, clearly and cynically provoked by the Kremlin against a post-Cold-War independent country, reignited one of the Caucasus’s bloody “frozen conflicts” from the early 1990s – in which Moscow shared much original blame. The Kremlin’s method was to “liberate” (occupy) sovereign Georgian territory (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and leave Georgian borders destabilized. The motive was to deny Georgia the right of self-determination, by negating the viability of her application to join the European Union and NATO. To bring matters up to the present, a reading of selected items in COMSUBLANT’s “Undersea Warfare News” e-mail daily suggests that funding (and timing) on Capitol Hill, for SSBN(X) ships and more VIRGINIA-class ships (including extended-hull VIRGINIA versions with the Virginia Payload Module – VPM – to make them SSGN-capable), continues in a long-term precarious state. And this is despite Russia’s recent military annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, plus Moscow’s ongoing (as of this writing) sponsorship of bloody territorial separatism/conquest in eastern Ukraine. What is to be done in this domestic ASW war of words? How can we best protect America’s overall defense readiness?

Demolishing The Flawed ASW Rhetoric: Two Prongs Besides “Going Up North” Again
The bogus claim that “America’s nuclear subs are Cold War relics” can perhaps be reversed most convincingly by resorting over and over to clear logic and established facts. But this only works if audience attention can be earned, and held, long enough for people to listen and understand, and then vote their consciences. This laudable goal is being served by submarine supporters far and wide, in part via the many and varied discussions extant re the indispensable mission roles played by the U.S. Sub Force ever since the “Evil Empire” of the USSR fell – the ongoing survivable strategic deterrent role of SSBNs being foremost among them. A brief overview is worth repeating here, for thoroughness and clarity of this article’s perspective. Though the Cold War might (or might not) be “over,” America’s nuclear subs continue to be essential tools for peace-maintenance and peace-restoration. This claim can be validated convincingly in at least two ways:

• Global Contingency Operations: As Sub Force leaders, the Submarine Industrial Base Council, and Naval Submarine League and U.S. Submarine Veterans, Inc., members have long helped impart to Congress and around the country, there are lots of other things nuclear subs are needed for besides winning cold wars against nuclear-armed evil empires. These other missions, successfully completed to “bring home the bacon” innumerable times since 1991, include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); indications and warnings; special operations support (SPECWAR); Tomahawk cruise missile land attack (such as USS FLORIDA’s 2011 firing of 93 cruise missiles against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s air assets); oceanic mapping/sampling for environmental and resource protection; mine-laying and minefield penetration; counter-terror and anti-piracy/anti-smuggling ops; downed-pilot lifeguard duty; undersea, surface, and aerial drone launch and/or control; anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection; and persistent access to areas that are subjected by adversaries to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons systems. The indispensable Sub Force missions also include 4,000 (and counting) safe and effective strategic nuclear deterrent patrols, in a world where nuclear warheads and their intercontinental delivery systems unfortunately continue to abound and proliferate.

• China’s rise: China’s rapid development toward a modern nuclear navy is an example of an emerging near-superpower competitor, thermonuclear ICBM armed, whose long-term regional and global intentions are not yet transparent. I do not wish to demonize China for following her own vision of “Manifest Destiny,” nor to condemn China for her frankly brilliant execution of the teachings of A.T. Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt. It nevertheless does seem reasonable for people in various countries to feel qualms about China’s expanding maritime territorial claims (her construction of artificial island bases in disputed local seas in particular), her growth in global power projection capabilities, and her repeated use of non-lethal or semi-lethal force at sea. China as a potential/encroaching threat, with growing naval forces including a burgeoning nuclear submarine fleet that includes SSBNs, certainly justifies continuing to fund a robust U.S. Navy Submarine Force.

A Frontal Assault on the “Cold War Relic” Claim
Perhaps the most direct, (and valid) way to attack the flawed logic that argues wrongly for the discontinuance, or further downsizing, of the U.S. Navy Submarine Force as Cold War relics, is to refute the claim that “the Cold War is over” – along with its accompanying, pernicious insinuation that this “ended-ness” is permanent. What if the Cold War with Russia were not over, even though the Soviet Union imploded down to the Russian Republic? Or, what if a new Cold War with (by) Russia (and/or with China for that matter), were to have already broken out, or be breaking out now, or lie just around the corner? Nuclear subs would then be just as much the essential, effective peace-and-survival tools going forward that they proved to be in the past. This makes it absolutely imperative to replace the OHIO-class SSBNs smartly, and build VIRGINIA-class SSNs and extended-hull VIRGINIA SSGNs numerously.

Let us posit, and justifiably celebrate, that the First Cold War did indeed end when the USSR ended. Subsequent events are showing that the “First Cold War” did not end all cold wars. Nor, alas, did it make the world safe for democracy, at least not yet. These concerns will be the focus of the remainder of this article.

Better Grasping EUCOM Security Trends by Connecting More Dots
One potentially harmful side effect of American (and wider Western) society’s forward-looking and peace-loving nature is having an overly short, overly optimistic collective memory regarding national defense policy and politics. Many commentators over the decades have noted how we Americans, and other NATO members as well, naturally crave rapidly ending any war in which we become involved, even if the underlying larger conflict remains unresolved. Naturally enough, we want to stop the killing – but then we rush into a period of disarmament to enjoy a well-earned “peace dividend.” The same commentators (each in their day) note how the killing then all too soon resumes. World War I as a causal/enabling factor led to World War II; World War II similarly led to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War led to (or at least coincided with) recurring wars with various Islamic extremists, ranging from al Qaeda to the Taliban to Saddam Hussein (two wars with Saddam, or three if we include the 1980s Tanker War after he invaded Iran), to Hamas and Hezbollah and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), plus other insurgencies or civil wars in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Syria and elsewhere.

We the People need to figure out a good way to preserve all our many admirable qualities, while “curing” what I think of as our ill-advised craving to retire prematurely from our de facto duty as the world’s policeman and arsenal of democracy. Just as crime will never cease short of some unattainable utopia, war will never cease so long as deteriorating social conditions, inter-ethnic bigotry, and sheer chance combine to let soulless, murderous sociopaths seize political power. By doing so, a few of them do gain control over massive armies and arsenals and then use them for slaughter – whether in nation-state dictatorships; or in failing, failed, or rogue states; or in terrorist, drug lord, or other armed groups. While not repeating mistakes we made in Afghanistan and Iraq, we must not let ourselves become paralyzed against well-planned, adequately resourced, broad coalition operations that are needed – and have both achievable goals and good exit strategies – in the future.

More broad public education and dialogue seem to be key, with a greater focus on today’s and tomorrow’s defense challenges and problems. Well-publicized, mass-market studying of military history in and of itself – perhaps because it needs to appeal best to commercialized, politicized pop culture audiences – has tended to become either a self-complacency building celebration of past victories, or a self-loathing building condemnation of past failures. Too much of either has the bad side effect of fomenting a contagious look-to-the-past, head-in-the-sand “future war denial” on the part of voters. Alas, this does not help promote learning of life-saving preparedness lessons for the next (inevitable) war.

One (purely illustrative, but, again, telling) example of this collective “short memory” in the West, regarding Russia’s belligerent conduct since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, crops up in a recent news article in The New York Times. The person quoted, perhaps surprisingly since Estonia felt Stalin’s boot in the USSR after it felt Hitler’s in the Third Reich, is Estonia’s president, Toomas Henrik Ilves.

“Tensions Surge in Estonia Amid a Russian Replay of Cold War Tactics,” by Andrew Higgins, ran on October 6, 2014. It discusses how, on September 5, a squad of Russian security operatives made a shallow penetration of Estonian territory to kidnap Eston Kohver, a Estonian internal security officer, and threw him in a Moscow prison on nonsensical charges of spying. The article quotes President Ilves as saying, “Is this the beginning of something [renewed Cold War-like tensions] or a one-off? Time will tell. You can’t draw a line until you have two points.” The article then notes portentously that on September 18, Russia seized a fishing vessel from neighboring Lithuania, in what Lithuania insists were international waters. As the reporter quite correctly says, “Russia added another point of reference.”

(Poor Mr. Ilves was subsequently tried in Moscow and sentenced to a long prison term. Later – in an incident right out of one of John le Carre’s Cold War spy novels – he was exchanged for a Russian operative arrested in the West.)

A more thorough review of publicly available information on Russian Federation military activity since 1991 will establish that there have been, in blaring public view all along, many other points of reference to prove that Cold War-style tensions never ended, or at least if they ended they almost immediately resumed. Nor is this “Russia Behaving Badly” thesis some mere myth, perpetuated by “Old Cold Warriors” or “Neo-Conservatives” in the West who allegedly have vested commercial, professional, or political interests in trying to prolong a long-dead conflict. Detailed discussions on Russian post-Cold War aggression and interference, with page upon page of scholarly footnotes, abound in academic journals and books, and in other publications generally seen as “liberal.”



NO “COLD WAR TO END ALL COLD WARS” – PART 2 By JOE BUFF


Executive Summary (Repeated from Part 1)
The persistent claims in some media and political quarters that America’s nuclear submarines are “Cold War relics” is invalidated in this two-part article by a multi-pronged attack on both 1) the underlying flawed post-Cold War military history involved, and 2) the sheer bad logical syllogism inherent in these claims. The U.S. Submarine Force was instrumental in winning the Cold War against the USSR; the Soviet Union fell but this did not in any way make nuclear subs antiquated or irrelevant.

This is particularly true for America’s survivable strategic nuclear deterrent ballistic missile subs, its SSBN fleet: The Russian Republic retained (or regained) all of the nuclear warhead stocks owned by the USSR in 1991. While steep reductions have been made by the U.S. and Russia alike, this has mainly been to reduce the massive “overkill” of tens of thousands of Cold War strategic weapons that could have wiped out all humanity several times over. Recently, Russia has been modernizing her nuclear warheads and delivery systems, increasing in both capacity and capability these tools for not just nuclear deterrence but also nuclear blackmail and nuclear destruction. Russia’s deployed tactical nuclear weapons, designed for use on local battlefields, outnumber NATO’s by about ten to one. The trend since 1991 across eastern EUCOM (U.S. European Command), and in CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) as well, in the Russian Federation’s repeated near-abroad aggressions – and in Moscow’s ongoing interference in U.S.-supported Middle East peacekeeping efforts (including in Libya, and now Syria with its mounting cross-Med immigration crisis) – indicates that either the Cold War never really ended, or a New Cold War by Russia has begun. Either way, we dare not send the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force into retirement. Other compelling national deterrence and defense needs also guarantee that nuclear subs must remain front-line tools for peace maintenance and peace restoration: 1) Nuclear armed China’s non-transparent military rise and territorial expansionism, and her own nuclear arsenal expansion and modernization including (reportedly) the recent introduction of destabilizing, escalatory land-based MIRVed ICBMs; plus 2) multiple U.S./NATO/UN overseas contingency operations and containment challenges against brutal dictatorships, terrorists (and the state sponsors of terrorism), and other armed groups – such as in North Korea and Iran, and continuing in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

The danger of bloody conflict will always be prevalent so long as the world has a running supply of talented, ambitious clinical sociopaths, some of whom claw their way to absolute power, seize control of armies and arsenals, and commit aggressive wars and ethnic/religious genocides. Perhaps only nuclear weapons are frightening enough as a deterrent to force even sociopathic – and other – dictatorships (nuclear armed and nuke wannabes alike) away from hot war toward cold war and from rearmament toward disarmament. We have already seen that our nuclear submarines’ superior designs and tactics can force a nuclear-armed adversary in a cold war onto the path toward (at least temporary, but decades-long) arms reduction and incrementally greater democracy. Thus, it is a U.S. national imperative that adequate funding be sustained for sufficiently numerous and promptly-built new SSBN(X) strategic deterrent subs (the OHIO-class replacements), more VIRGINIA-class fast attack SSNs in general, and the extended-hull SSGN-capable VIRGINIAs (with the Virginia Payload Module – VPM) in particular. These vessels and their crews remain vital to current and future national security, homeland defense, and world peace and prosperity.

Russia Makes a Datum, Over and Over Again
This second part of a two-part article begins by taking a matrix overview of post-1989 Late-Soviet-cum-Russian Federation aggression. Though listed one by one for flow and readability, each of these matrix entries has two dimensions: location, and tactics. Russia’s tactics, while they evolve as tactics always do, tend to repeat in different locations.

Transparent economic competition alone does not in this article’s context constitute “aggression,” since such competition lies at the heart of healthy, capitalist economic growth and progress, and is basic to a good system of open access and unrestrained world commerce. Ruthless economic-warfare tactics intended to cause populations to suffer physically, emotionally, and/or financially, in order to enrich a few demagogues and/or deny basic human rights, however, do constitute cold war aggression as meant here. Use of United Nations Security Council veto power to short-circuit well-intentioned NATO (or other Western-led) peacekeeping efforts does qualify as “interference,” which I also take as a form of cold war aggression. (I do not include in this matrix the mounting series of recent, escalating and dangerous underwater and airspace incursions by Russia against both several NATO members, and non-NATO countries Sweden, Finland, and Japan. Some of these are unconfirmed, while others could be dismissed as mere “navigation error.” The incidents were fleeting, they have been reported and commented on elsewhere, and there have been no casualties – not yet.)

Locations of Russian expansionism and/or interference have peppered former Iron Curtain territory. Connecting these dots draws a widespread constellation covering much former Soviet Communist turf – areas many commentators suspect Russia’s imperialistic potentate Vladimir Putin and his supporters want and intend to fully control again, soon.

Locations subject to intimidation and bloodshed are of at least three different types: current Russian Federation provinces (oblasts) or ethnic autonomous districts (krais), former republics of the USSR (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) that are now fully independent countries, and countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact (Moscow’s answer to NATO) but not part of the USSR itself. Here is a list with approximate years of the most active (invasion and/or shooting and/or ruthless intimidation) conflicts in each place. These can be thought of as the New Cold War’s brushfire or proxy battles, so far.

1. The North Caucasus, particularly in the Russian Federation areas of Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Dagestan – lying at one edge of the old Ottoman Empire, these contain many Muslim residents. Bloody counter-secessionist wars, which some commentators claim were started or provoked by Russia, in the early to mid-1990s and again in 2000 to 2004 and smoldering to the present. Some journalists claim plausibly that deadly terrorist attacks supposedly committed by Chechen separatists (a crowded theater, occupied apartment buildings, a bustling subway station, a large school full of teachers and children) were actually perpetrated, or at least intentionally badly aggravated, by Russian security operatives for the Kremlin’s political gain. (One could consider Russia’s ongoing quagmire suppressing Chechnya to be “Moscow’s second Vietnam”, after their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979—1989.)

2. The Republic of Georgia, especially but not only in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Bloody, supposedly secessionist-led conflicts, encouraged and supported by Russia, occurred in the early 1990s, when Russia’s occupying peacekeepers forced one-sided “frozen conflict” agreements, rife with conflicts of interest favoring Moscow hegemony. These happened again in 2008. During the 2008 war, the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, was bombed extensively by Russian jets. That brief war’s total death count was several thousand fighters and innocent civilians, with some 200,000 temporarily or permanently displaced refugees.

3. Former Yugoslavia, also known as the Balkans, in Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic’s “ethnic cleansing” wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1990s. Russia, in the UN and on the ground, supported Milosevic’s clear-cut genocidal massacres while undermining NATO attempts to halt the bloodshed. Many tens of thousands died, and several millions were displaced, many across international borders. Russia then attempted, quite aggressively but ultimately unsuccessfully, to unilaterally seize a Kremlin-controlled military cantonment at the strategic Pristina Airport in Kosovo. (Russia’s current operation to expand and use an air base at Latakia, in support of dictator Bashar al-Assad in civil war-torn Syria, seems like an eerie repeat of such a blatant power grab – but this time one that has not been halted, yet.)

4. Moldova’s eastern Transnistria district. Separatists supported by elements of the Soviet/Russian army broke away in a war lasting from 1990 to 1992. This remains another area of “frozen conflict” on Russia’s border, i.e., part of a de facto renewed Russian sphere of influence.

5. The Republic of Ukraine, in the Crimean Peninsula and in the Donets River Basin (Donbass). Harsh economic warfare over natural gas supplies in 2005-2006 and again in 2010-2011. Full-scale invasions, with about eight thousand soldiers and civilians killed on all sides, in 2013 through 2015 and ongoing despite the purported Minsk ceasefire agreement. (The economic warfare included periods of cynically, cruelly denying Ukrainian men, women, and children their basic human right to adequate heating and cooking fuel, which they needed to survive freezing winter months. Vladimir Putin in October 2014, while receiving Serbia’s highest medal at a military parade in Belgrade, threatened this freezing-out tactic again.)

6. The Baltic States: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Ongoing economic (energy) intimidation, plus destructive cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, which escalated in 2014 to small incursions of international borders for abducting innocent Baltic State citizens. Estonia, which likes to call herself “E-stonia,” has been justifiably proud of that nation’s widespread use of modern computer and communication technologies and the Internet. These cyber-attacks, according to analysts, were conducted by Russian security forces, and/or directed by such forces while manned by Russian “citizen hackers” -- who are not officially part of any Russian government entity but do take orders from that government.

7. Armenia’s Russia-assisted domination of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh region. Another late-Soviet Union, then early-Russian, now frozen armed conflict, where heavy fighting lasted from the late 1980s to 1994. There were thousands of casualties on both sides, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. The disputed territory continues to be dominated by Russian interests, with Russian “peace-keeping” forces holding sway over valuable Azerbaijan agricultural land and pipeline routes near Iran and Turkey.

A common theme in these matrix entries, part of modern post- or New Cold War tactics, is how Russia seeks to maintain what I think of as implausible deniability for its aggression. This is done by trying to act invisibly, through third parties such as supposedly independent separatist militias, or Russian soldiers who are supposedly “taking vacation,” or supposedly volunteer (civilian) “citizen hackers.” But as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has insisted about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the evidence of Kremlin culpability is clear. Nobody – at least, outside Russia’s tightly controlled internal media propaganda audience – is being fooled.

Russia also seeks to justify its aggression by claiming to be simply protecting and helping Russians who reside in neighboring countries. But the definition of “Russian” in this context seems to depend on Moscow’s expansionist goal of the moment. It could mean Russian by place of birth or citizenship (and Russian Federation passports are handed out liberally in her near-abroad), Russian by language spoken at home, or pan-Slavic by ethnicity, or Eastern Orthodox by religion. Using such protectionism as an excuse to invade neighbors is in direct contradiction to all modern standards of civilized behavior between nations. It is much too redolent of Adolf Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland on the excuse that German speakers lived there. Of course, modern democracies do recognize that willing-coalition military invasions might occasionally be needed to intervene against violent ethnic/religious discrimination in failing states. However, there is scant evidence of any systematic, violent oppression of Russians within Russia’s neighbors, nor any evidence at all that the targeted governments in the Baltic States, or Georgia, or Armenia or Moldova or Ukraine were in any way becoming genocidal.

Some in the West argue that Russia’s renewed expansionism is a reluctant but essential response by the Kremlin, to NATO directly threatening Russian security in what used to be Moscow-owned territory. This threat is supposedly embodied in what is simply the willing (in fact, eager) expansion of NATO to include much of the former Iron Curtain. (NATO membership was promised to Georgia and Ukraine, though a date was not set.) Russia has no valid claim to renewing its empire; it lost the Cold War and pulled back its occupying forces, fair and square. It is a very basic human right for any sovereign nation to choose what international organizations to apply to join or not, and what treaties to sign and ratify or not.

The Crimea is on the Black Sea: Security in Russia’s “Watery Near-Abroad”
Russia’s aggressive annexation of the Crimean Peninsula gains her much more than just some land territory and Russian-speaking citizenry. As The New York Times very rightly pointed out in “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,” on May 17, 2014 by William J. Broad, the Crimea juts into the Black Sea. The surrounding Black Sea waters and seabed contain many valuable resources, including fish stocks and fuel reserves. The Kremlin can try to exploit the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes a 200-nautical-mile-wide Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the coast of each country. (UNCLOS includes somewhat ambiguous rules and regulations for drawing dividing lines when two countries’ EEZs overlap, as the Crimea’s – if it were a country, which it isn’t – certainly does overlap with the rest of Ukraine’s.)

But there’s more. The Black Sea floor is of strategic importance if only because it is festooned with underwater oil and gas pipelines, leading from fossil fuel fields in Central Asia (the Caspian Sea bed, western Siberia, Kazakhstan) toward Europe. Controlling seabed corridors in “its own EEZ” would allow Russia to construct more such pipelines (some are underway or planned) that skirt what would be unwelcome Western influence if they were routed instead by land and/or through EEZ seabed owned by Turkey or Ukraine. As mentioned earlier, economic warfare via throttling back fuel supplies to other countries is an important tactic in Russia’s New Cold War soft-power arsenal; underwater pipelines in its own-controlled or else in open international waters are much harder for third-party nations to turn off or tap. (This tactic has also been used against the Baltic States, in the Baltic Sea.) If Russia has multiple routes to Western Europe that do not cut across Ukraine (or Turkey either), it can reap energy revenues to the former while freezing out the latter – as it has already tried to do.

Additionally, possessing the Crimea gives Russia total control over the long-coveted land territory around the major former Soviet naval base at Sevastopol, which up until their invasion-annexation they had been leasing from and sharing with Ukraine – and thus perforce sharing with Ukraine’s Western friends and allies. Furthermore, the Black Sea connects to the Mediterranean Sea, through the narrow Bosporus Straits and Dardanelles which both belong to Turkey. Turkey has long been a member of NATO, and neither Turkey nor the United States have yet ratified UNCLOS, although the Pentagon wants the U.S. Senate to do so.

The Montreaux Convention of 1936, as amended since then, gave Turkey sovereign control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. This has provided NATO a major strategic advantage in case of cold conflict or hot war. During the Cold War, the USSR repeatedly protested Turkey’s ownership of these vital waterways. At times Moscow played such shenanigans as making sure a Soviet warship was always transiting the straits, so as to diminish NATO control. Russia now is reportedly trying to use selective readings of parts of UNCLOS to give it more wide-open access even in wartime through these straits. This is in direct contradiction to exclusive territorial claims it is trying to make under UNCLOS to key international straits on the Northeast Sea Route, above the coast of Siberia on the Arctic Ocean. These convention controversies seem likely to continue, and are beyond the scope of this article (as are arguments about recent alleged violations of First Cold War-era missile shield – ABM – and land-based cruise missile – INF – Treaties).

What is central to this article is for readers to recognize that land grabs along coastlines also constitute substantial ocean and seabed grabs. The Black Sea, because of its location – bordering much of Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Russia, the western Caucasus (both North and South), and Turkey (gateway to the Middle East and Asia) – besides its ample natural resources, is a very important body of water indeed. Much of the Black Sea is deep enough for nuclear submarine operations. Western subs can enter from the Med covertly with Turkey’s compliance. Forward presence in the Black Sea gives U.S. Navy intelligence and force-projection assets, whether submarines, surface ships, or manned or unmanned aircraft, much closer reach (and longer dwell time) into Russian territory (physically and electromagnetically), than does presence staged from vessels in the Eastern Med. Speaking of “cold” war, keeping global perspective balance, and making multiple prongs of attack on flawed defense logic, the national security issues involved here are every bit as important as the similar unresolved conflicts about competing territorial claims between nations – including the U.S. and Russia – in the Arctic Ocean.

Cold Wars as a Never-ending Story: Sociable Sociopaths in Power
Personally I have a theory, that the world will not soon see an end to war because the world will not soon run out of sociopaths. What is a sociopath? A collation of definitions found on the Internet shows that a sociopath (sometimes called, synonymously, a psychopath) is a person lacking in any sense of remorse or conscience, who has no regard whatsoever for the physical or psychological well being of other humans. (They often, but not always, come from a very neglectful and abusive childhood – though possibly an affluent one – and there is a genetic component as well.) A taste of power corrupts them quite absolutely. Of course, many people with sociopathic tendencies are high functioning, and the majority do not come to the attention of psychiatrists or law enforcement authorities, let alone military historians. But imagine what can happen when social, psychological, political, economic, security, environmental, ethnic bigotry, and religious-strife conditions all conspire to let one become an absolute dictator!

Groups of people, even entire societies, can combine in unfortunate ways to collectively behave as a coven of sociopaths, typically under one domineering leader – this is known as a group psychosis. Sociopaths tend to be extremely, compulsively manipulative, even true geniuses at it. Smoothly charming opportunists, oily and pushy social chameleons, they make astonishingly convincing con men (and women). This is because they are “perfect” liars, who dissemble successfully since they have no conscience or remorse about lying, and thus give away no “tells.” They tend to be very egotistical, narcissistic-exhibitionistic, and vindictive, reacting against any challenges to their primacy with vicious, sarcastic rhetoric – and violence, often administered for them by those they control. Again, think about ambitious, talented sociopaths let loose in the foreign relations sphere. They excel at a twisted behavioral two-step: provoking ire in others through their own nasty conduct, then angrily condemning those others for feeling such ire rather than accept any responsibility themselves for the provocation. This last trait gives an unfair advantage to sociopathic potentates: They play on America’s so-called liberal condition, which is for some of our influential citizenry to blame ourselves for all the world’s ills.

Some psychologists estimate that 1% of the American population are sociopaths. A clinical study of 200 corporate managers by Canadian psychology professor Robert D. Hare (e.g., Psychology Today, vol. 27, no. 1, 1994, pp. 54-61) suggested that 4% of top business executives fit the diagnosis. You don’t need to be a lurid serial killer to be a sociopath/psychopath – this apparent statistical “distillation” from 1% to 4%, from the general population down to the subset of corporate managers, suggests to me that some sociopaths are especially attracted to positions that yield great managerial power and wealth, and then their aberrant personalities provide them a competitive edge to claw their way to the top.

Ruthlessly amassing political power to eagerly command mass death and destruction certainly qualifies someone as a sociopath. The biggest wars and worst ethnic/religious cleansings of modern history were instigated by sociopaths; in total, many tens of millions of innocent people have died in the 20th century alone. Examples include Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein, and Slobodan Milosevic. One of their best (worst) weapons – as is sometimes also said about the Devil himself – is how sociopaths shrewdly exploit the fact that many people don’t even suspect their terrible pathology’s very existence. They have a special knack for passing themselves off as perfectly well adjusted, happy and responsible, charismatic leaders.

Why does this matter to national defense? A sociopath is very selfish and grandiosely over-confident, but they also, over time, become increasingly reckless in pursuit of further gains, and can even appear to normal people to be suicidal. (Think Hitler invading Russia.) Negotiating effectively across a diplomatic conference table with a sociopath and their sycophantic, even psychotic retinue is exceedingly difficult.

A sociopath is diagnosed by their behavioral symptoms. Some commentators have wondered whether Vladimir Putin might be a sociopath. This is meant as a serious question, not an insult. The question is a very important one because, I would argue, it is empirically true that sociopaths with enough power do cast a spell over hordes of followers, and then start wars and/or genocides. Humanity alas does include an unfortunate share of sociopaths. The members of this demonic talent pool are always vying among themselves and the general population for supremacy. In a perverse form of social Darwinism, only the strongest, most dangerous of the sociopaths attain the pinnacle of power, to cast their lasting stain upon human history.

We need not be 100% certain that Mr. Putin does or does not fit the diagnosis; a probability somewhat greater than zero that he might be – which is what I perceive – is sufficient to cause great alarm. We also need some healthy concern that his eventual successor, whoever that is, might fit the behavioral profile. This is because our duty to global security risk mitigation demands extreme caution on our part in interpreting modern Russia’s chronically disingenuous, provocatively belligerent behavioral trends; that same duty requires extreme care in making our decisions about things like “friendship” or “engagement” or “containment” or “confrontation” between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. This should particularly be borne in mind near term, during further deliberations about diplomacy, economic sanctions, and other measures aimed at resolving 1) the ongoing Ukraine/Crimea crisis, and 2) Russia’s recent air power and seapower deployments into civil-war torn Syria.

As the USSR saw the hard way, cold wars can be lost. But the resulting regime change can only be counted on as an enabler of incremental progress toward greater transparency and accountability, democracy and freedom, and peace and prosperity, if the good guys win. Certainly Russia is a much better place for most of its people to live in today, compared to under hard-line repressionists Leonid Brezhnev or Josef Stalin or the Romanov czar-emperors. This is thanks to laudable reforms first tried by Nikita Khrushchev and by Alexei Kosygin, then fomented by Gorbachev, with the further modernizations instigated or at least allowed under Yeltsin and Putin – with generous help and encouragement from the West. America and our allies must be certain to win any future cold wars.

Conclusion: Crucial Investments for Peace and Prosperity
Hot, shooting wars are terrible and tend to spread uncontrollably for years before they can be ended. Sociopathic dictators are extremely manipulative, perfect liars who have no conscience or remorse, no regard for human life, and seek every opportunity to amass total power and start wars of aggression and genocide.

If the supply of sociopaths in the human race is truly never-ending, civilized society might benefit by learning to view an ongoing cold war as an important form of peacekeeping success: It is a way to divert an entrenched sociopathic/psychopathic aggressor leader or whole society away from a path to hot war and ethnic/religious cleansing. In this sense, nuclear weapons evolved rapidly from an American hot-war-ending weapon in 1945 to a NATO hot-war-preventing weapon against the Soviet Union-led Warsaw Pact. This, again, should be viewed as an important peacekeeping success. Perhaps nuclear weapons will always be needed as a strategic deterrent, because only they are terrifying enough to frighten even a sociopath onto the path to cold war and then peace.

Peace maintenance is very, very expensive, but it is much less costly than war. Peace-enforcement and peace-enablement must be invested in continually, and heavily, to prevent widespread war. Cold wars can be lost, just as they can be won. The winner can help foment loser regime change, which can allow incremental progress toward higher living standards and greater democracy – but only if the good guys win. Several areas of investment come to mind:
• Maintain a strong, agile, well-balanced military. A robust U.S. Navy Submarine Force is an important part of this mix. Rapid and full funding, without lapses or backsliding, is absolutely essential for the Sub Force’s badly needed dozen SSBN(X) subs (the OHIO-class replacements), and the forty-eight VIRGINIA class SSNs – including SSGN-capable VIRGINIAs with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) and diverse payload vehicles. Despite great progress in fabrication and in training methods, it takes most of a decade to buy and build a nuclear sub, and to then give her crew the necessary at-sea operational seasoning. America and our allies and friends also need to invest further for balanced and effective conventional and nuclear deterrence forces and for effective all-domain defense and resiliency. This must cover everything from the missiles and dual-capable aircraft (DCA) legs of a modernized, safe, secure, reliable Nuclear Triad Force; to sufficient sea-surface, air, and ground conventional capacity and capabilities; to enhanced security and recoverability for cyberspace (including seabed fiber optic cable links) and out-space assets, platforms, and personnel (including cheap, disposable “cube-sat” satellites).

• Better sustain, and further focus, systematically informing the American general public, along with governmental policy makers and decision makers, to enhance collective memory about recent and current military realities, and also strengthen cognizance of present, near-term, and long-term future defense challenges and opportunities. Better balance and flesh out society’s and politicians’ very necessary military events consciousness. This is essential in order to chart the wisest course for our nation, that errs neither toward excessively celebrating past victories in a manner that can lead to complacency, nor excessively condemning past failures in a manner that can compromise current and future defense preparedness.

• Achieve better U.S. and world energy security. One area of investment for peace and prosperity, where good laboratory progress has been made recently -- but long-term investment was, I think, shortchanged over the past several decades – is learning to harness commercial-scale “hot” fusion reactor power for abundant electricity. Fusion reactors would be inherently much safer and much more environmentally friendly than fission reactors; they can never suffer a nuclear blast and cannot be used to make nuclear bombs. They would produce energy as efficiently as our Sun does, using as fuel source the vast world ocean’s most plentiful element, hydrogen. Generating electricity 24/7/365, independent of cycles and vagaries of sunshine, wind, and tide, they would be constructed in a capital-intensive way at centralized locations – which ought to make them of significant interest at this point to the forward-looking fossil fuel and nuclear energy industries. (Hedge funds and high-tech star-ups are beginning to invest in this area as well.) Compact, mobile hot fusion reactors could also some day power surface ships and submarines, sidestepping the quandary over HEU versus LEU in our subs and aircraft carriers. Likewise, greater investment in liquid natural gas transport ships, plus more active construction of the special port facilities and local distribution pipe systems needed to deliver the gas to homes and factories, would reduce dependence on trans-national pipelines – whether on land or along the seabed – which can be held hostage during cold war.

• Strive for better economic growth, and economic stability, in the U.S. and worldwide. Wisely balance laissez-faire capitalism and regulatory oversight, and provide such best practices structural-procedural assistance abroad – especially to prevent more financial industry sociopaths (such as Bernie Madoff, or his Ponzi scheme imitators in Albania) from destabilizing whole economies. Economic disruptions heighten risk of a sociopath demagogue’s rise, while making it more difficult for democracies to sustain a good international focus and afford adequate defense preparedness. Balance taxation, revenue, and monetary policies with the need to clearly and publicly recognize something very fundamental: Money needs to be spent to preserve peace and enhance prosperity, so as to protect – and grow – the value of all sorts of American assets, rather than risk mass destruction of those assets in terrorism and war. We as a nation and a society simply must invest in defense, to defend corporate investments and personal savings alike.

• Seek out better clinical practices and laws, and diplomatic, intelligence, and special operations mechanisms, for limiting the scope of sociopathic behavior at a national and international level. Early intervention, overtly or covertly, is key. Hitler could only be stopped by brute force. He could have been most easily stopped early, when he reoccupied the Rhineland, or annexed Austria, or occupied the Sudetenland. Sociopath dictators simply cannot be appeased. Their grandiose, rabble-rousing warmongering talk is all too often not mere campaign blather or “for domestic use only.” Threatening unprovoked, aggressive war should be no more acceptable free speech than shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. Dictators must be held responsible, early on, for making such provocative threats, with international courts and peacekeeping bodies watching for and sanctioning this felonious conduct. The instantaneous information connectivity of today’s world, and the immense lethality of today’s weapons systems, demand early corrective intervention, with wise advance planning but without hesitation and without obfuscation. It is bogus to fear “provoking” the demonic urges to mass death and destruction that sociopaths already feel deep inside. It is essential to avoid enabling and empowering them. Who will be the first Hitler or Hitler-wannabe of the 21st century?

The bloody intentions of sociopathic dictators, and their mesmerizing power to delude whole populations into criminal and even group-psychotic war-making and ethnic/religious cleansing behavior, must never be underestimated. Continual investing for peace is essential. Mounting tensions with unrepentant autocrat Vladimir Putin and “his” Russia currently present a serious potential/emerging threat to European security, world peace, and the American way of life.

China’s own territorial and nuclear expansionism, plus the Middle East’s ongoing atrocities during Islamic extremists’ drive for some sort of New Caliphate (horrors from which China and Russia are by no means completely safe), add further urgency and complexity to calls to repeal U.S. budget sequestration and protect the funding for U.S. defense capabilities and capacity. Cold war is indeed very expensive when it occurs, but it is much better than hot war. America’s nuclear submarine fleet and her courageous, self-sacrificing Submariners successfully divert dictatorships away from starting big hot wars, they help keep cold wars cold, and they have proven their ability to undermine evil empires and allow the incremental spread of global democracy.



Bibliography
The research for this article used a number of entries in several Internet or e-mail resources, including COMSUBLANT’s “Undersea Warfare News,” the Popular Psychology on-line archives, Google.com, Wikipedia.org, and WebMD.com. I also read various relevant articles in the periodicals The New York Times and Foreign Affairs. I studied the following books (print editions unless noted as e-book):

Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World—Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: St. Martins, 2010).
Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door—How the Alliance Remade Itself For A New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, Arkady Babchenko, One Soldier’s War [Chechnya] (New York: Grove, 2007).
Stephen J. Blank, ed., Central Asia After 2014 (Lexington, KY: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013).
Stephen J. Blank, Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995).
Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy—The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 (London: Profile, 2011).
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision—America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012).
Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace—Russia’s New Imperialism (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).
Oliver Bullough, Let Our Fame Be Great—Journeys Among the Defiant People of the Caucasus (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus—An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.)
Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1995).
Agnia Grigas, The Politics of Energy and Memory Between the Baltic States and Russia (Surrey, VT: Ashgate, 2013).
Richard Holbrooke, To End a War [Bosnia] (New York: Random House, 1998).
Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (London: Praeger, 1964).
Tim Judah, Kosovo—War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts—A Journey Through History (New York: Random House, 1993).
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
Michael Korda, Journey to a Revolution—A Personal Memoir and History of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
Roman Khromushkin, The Struggle Over Ukraine’s Future—The Question of Integration Between Russian Federation and the European Union (Self-published e-book.)
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience—Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2008).
Allen C. Lynch, Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011).
John Morrison, Boris Yeltsin—From Bolshevik to Democrat (New York: Dutton, 1991).
Anna Politovskaya, A Russian Diary—A Journalist’s Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin’s Russia (New York: Random House, 2007).
David Rieff, Slaughterhouse—Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
Maximillian Spinner, Civil War and Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Moldova (Budapest: Central European University, accessed as Kindle e-book, date not given).
Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand—A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002).
Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968—Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

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